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Free keywords:
institutional change, discourse, financial crisis, varieties of capitalism, culture, path dependence
Abstract:
Why was there no fundamental change of financial regulation after the 2008 credit
crunch? This article argues that the limited regulatory changes of German and
British financial markets can be explained by the influence moral boundaries
between legitimate and illegitimate financial practices had on policymakers’ crisis
perception. In German public debate of 2008, speculation as opposed to firm investment
was seen as cause of the crisis. The British crisis narrative held illegitimate
profits responsible that were gained from excessive risk-taking as opposed to risk
management. These distinct legitimizing patterns (a) fostered a selective perception
of the crisis that downplayed domestic structural causes of the crisis, and (b) directed
regulatory efforts away from fundamental reforms. In fact, both national debates saw
the institutional regime of their financial markets re-affirmed by the crisis and in need
of readjustment. Conceptually, the article shows the affinity between public moral
boundaries of legitimate economic practices and the core institutional principles of
market regimes.
