English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
  Divergent platforms

Bade, S. (2016). Divergent platforms. Theory and Decision, 80(4), 561-580.

Item is

Files

show Files

Locators

show

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Bade, Sophie1, Author              
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: Downs model; Games with incomplete preferences; Knightian uncertainty; Platform divergence; Uncertainty aversion
 Abstract: Models of electoral competition between two opportunistic, office-motivated parties typically predict that both parties become indistinguishable in equilibrium. I show that this strong connection between the office motivation of parties and their equilibrium choice of identical platforms depends on two—possibly false—assumptions: (1) Issue spaces are uni-dimensional and (2) Parties are unitary actors whose preferences can be represented by expected utilities. I provide an example of a two-party model in which parties offer substantially different equilibrium platforms even though no exogenous differences between parties are assumed. In this example, some voters’ preferences over the 2-dimensional issue space exhibit non-convexities and parties evaluate their actions with respect to a set of beliefs on the electorate.

Details

show
hide
Language(s):
 Dates: 2015201520152016
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: Peer
 Identifiers: -
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source 1

show
hide
Title: Theory and Decision
Source Genre: Journal
 Creator(s):
Affiliations:
Publ. Info: -
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 80 (4) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 561 - 580 Identifier: -