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  If the Worst Comes to the Worst. Dictator Giving When Recipient’s Endowments are Risky

Engel, C., & Goerg, S. J. (2015). If the Worst Comes to the Worst. Dictator Giving When Recipient’s Endowments are Risky.

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 Creators:
Engel, Christoph1, Author              
Goerg, Sebastian J.1, Author              
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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Free keywords: Dictator Game, Uncertainty, Donation
 JEL: D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
 JEL: C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
 JEL: D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
 Abstract: Donors may often not be sure whether a recipient really deserves their help. Does this uncertainty deter generosity? In an experiment we find that, to the contrary, under most specifications of uncertainty, dictators give more, compared with the donation the same dictator makes to a recipient they know to have the expected value of the endowment with certainty. They are particularly concerned about the possibility that a recipient leaves the lab with no payoff from the game.

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 Dates: 2015
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: 46
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2015/15
 Degree: -

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