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  Restraining Regulatory Capture: An Empirical Examination of the Power of Weak Interests in Financial Reforms

Kastner, L. (2016). Restraining Regulatory Capture: An Empirical Examination of the Power of Weak Interests in Financial Reforms. PhD Thesis, Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris, Paris.

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 Creators:
Kastner, Lisa1, 2, Author           
Affiliations:
1International Max Planck Research School on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_1214550              
2Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo), MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_1631137              

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2016-01-132016
 Publication Status: Issued
 Pages: X, 269
 Publishing info: Paris : Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris
 Table of Contents: List of Figures and Tables
List of Abbreviations
Acknowledgments
PART I THEORY
1. Introduction
Crisis, Newly Mobilizing Societal Actors and Financial Reforms
Goals of this Study
Capture Theories of Financial Regulatory Reforms
The Puzzle: Why did Regulatory Change Occur?
Restraining Capture: Salience and Actor Plurality
The Power of Diffuse Interests
The Overall Argument in Brief
Case Selection for Theory-Testing Process-Tracing
Plan of the Dissertation
2. A Theory of Financial Regulatory Change
Towards a Causal Mechanism of Group-Official Relations
Scope Conditions: Crises and Limits of Capture
Political Opportunities: Access and Receptivity
Mobilization of Diffuse Interests
Policy Entrepreneurs
Government Allies
Conceptualization of the Causal Argument
3. Methods
Defining Causal Mechanisms
Operationalization of Process-Tracing Tests
Data Sources
PART II THE CASES
4. Winner-Take-All Politics and Diffuse Interests: The US Consumer Regulator
Introduction
Regulatory Change and Group Influence
The Legislative Struggle for the CFPB
Advocacy for a new Consumer Finance Regulator
Contextual Conditions: Post-Crisis Financial Regulatory Environment
Political Opportunities: Access and Receptivity
Mobilization of Diffuse Interests
Policy Entrepreneurship
Government Allies
Conclusions
5. Policy Compromise and Diffuse Interests in Financial Regulation: EU Consumer
Finance Reforms
Introduction
Regulatory Change and Group Influence
Contextual Conditions Underlying EU Financial Reforms
Advocacy for Regulatory Reform
Political Opportunities: Access and Receptivity
Mobilization of Diffuse Interests
Governmental Allies
Diffuse Interests, Allies and Consumer Protection Reforms
Legislative Initiative 1: New European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)
Legislative Initiative 2: European Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD)
Legislative Initiative 3: Retail Investment Products (PRIPS/KID)
Legislative Initiative 4: Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MifID II)
Conclusions
6. Diffuse Interests and the Limits of Lobbying: Case Study of the Financial Transaction
Tax (FTT) in the US
Introduction
Group Influence: From Forbidden Topic to Parliamentary Agenda
Advocacy for a FTT
Contextual Conditions
Political Opportunities: Access and Receptivity
Mobilization of Diffuse Interests and Coalitions Not Forged
Weak Governmental Allies
Conclusions
7. Diffuse Interests and the Limits of Capture: Case Study of the EU FTT
Introduction
Regulatory Change and Group Influence
The Policy Debate
Advocacy for a Financial Transaction Tax
Contextual Conditions: Post-Crisis Financial Regulatory Environment
Political Opportunities: Access and Receptivity
Mobilization of Diffuse Interests
Government Allies
Changed Contextual Conditions: Low-salience Politics
Conclusions
PART III EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS
8. Conclusion
Summarizing the Argument
The Explanation of Success
Comparative Case Studies
Diffuse Interests in Transatlantic Comparison
Business Power
Cooptation
Return to Pluralism
Limitations and Future Research
How to Mitigate Capture in Regulatory Decision Making
9. Appendix
List of Conducted Interviews
Bibliography
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: -
 Degree: PhD

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