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  Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion

Milinski, M., Hilbe, C., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R. D., & Marotzke, J. (2016). Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion. Nature Communications, 7: 10915. doi:10.1038/NCOMMS10915.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002A-15AE-1 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002A-4A24-E
Genre: Journal Article

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 Creators:
Milinski, Manfred1, Author              
Hilbe, Christian, Author
Semmann, Dirk1, Author              
Sommerfeld, Ralf D.1, Author              
Marotzke, Jochem, Author
Affiliations:
1Department Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445634              

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 Abstract: Social dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain. In many dilemmas, such as elected governments negotiating climate-change mitigation measures, the decisions are made not by individual players but by their representatives. However, the behaviour of representatives in social dilemmas has not been investigated experimentally. Here inspired by the negotiations for greenhouse-gas emissions reductions, we experimentally study a collective-risk social dilemma that involves representatives deciding on behalf of their fellow group members. Representatives can be re-elected or voted out after each consecutive collective-risk game. Selfish players are preferentially elected and are hence found most frequently in the ‘representatives’ treatment. Across all treatments, we identify the selfish players as extortioners. As predicted by our mathematical model, their steadfast strategies enforce cooperation from fair players who finally compensate almost completely the deficit caused by the extortionate co-players. Everybody gains, but the extortionate representatives and their groups gain the most.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2016-03-072016-03-07
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Method: Peer
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1038/NCOMMS10915
 Degree: -

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Title: Nature Communications
  Abbreviation : Nat. Commun.
Source Genre: Journal
 Creator(s):
Affiliations:
Publ. Info: London : Nature Publishing Group
Pages: 9 Seiten Volume / Issue: 7 Sequence Number: 10915 Start / End Page: - Identifier: ISSN: 2041-1723
CoNE: /journals/resource/2041-1723