English
 
User Manual Privacy Policy Disclaimer Contact us
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
  Institutional Endogeneity and Third-party Punishment in Social Dilemmas

Marcin, I., Robalo, P., & Tausch, F. (2016). Institutional Endogeneity and Third-party Punishment in Social Dilemmas.

Item is

Basic

show hide
Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002A-304D-5 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002C-EC75-4
Genre: Paper

Files

show Files

Locators

show
hide
Description:
-

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Marcin, Isabel1, Author              
Robalo, Pedro1, Author              
Tausch, Franziska1, Author              
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: Endogeneity, Third-party punishment, Voting, Institutions, Social dilemma, Public good
 JEL: C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
 JEL: D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
 JEL: D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
 JEL: H41 - Public Goods
 Abstract: This paper studies experimentally how the endogeneity of sanctioning institutions affects the severity of punishment in social dilemmas. We allow individuals to vote on the introduction of third-party-administered sanctions, and compare situations in which the adoption of this institution is endogenously decided via majority voting to situations in which it is exogenously imposed by the experimenter. Our experimental design addresses the self-selection and signaling effects that arise when subjects can vote on the institutional setting. We find that punishment is significantly higher when the sanctioning institution is exogenous, which can be explained by a difference in the effectiveness of punishment. Subjects respond to punishment more strongly when the sanctioning institution is endogenously chosen. As a result, a given cooperation level can be reached through milder punishment when third-party sanctions are endogenous. However, overall efficiency does not differ across the two settings as the stricter punishment implemented in the exogenous one sustains high cooperation as subjects interact repeatedly.

Details

show
hide
Language(s):
 Dates: 2016
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: 52
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2016/06
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source

show