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  Signaling equilibria in sensorimotor interactions

Leibfried, F., Grau-Moya, J., & Braun, D. (2015). Signaling equilibria in sensorimotor interactions. Cognition, 141, 73-86. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.03.008.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002A-44F4-6 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0003-89E0-5
Genre: Journal Article

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 Creators:
Leibfried, F1, Author              
Grau-Moya, J1, 2, Author              
Braun, DA1, 3, Author              
Affiliations:
1Research Group Sensorimotor Learning and Decision-Making, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Max Planck Society, ou_1497809              
2Dept. Empirical Inference, Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems, Max Planck Society, ou_1497647              
3Research Group Sensorimotor Learning and Decision-making, Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems, Max Planck Society, ou_1688138              

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 Abstract: Although complex forms of communication like human language are often assumed to have evolved out of more simple forms of sensorimotor signaling, less attention has been devoted to investigate the latter. Here, we study communicative sensorimotor behavior of humans in a two-person joint motor task where each player controls one dimension of a planar motion. We designed this joint task as a game where one player (the sender) possesses private information about a hidden target the other player (the receiver) wants to know about, and where the sender's actions are costly signals that influence the receiver's control strategy. We developed a game-theoretic model within the framework of signaling games to investigate whether subjects' behavior could be adequately described by the corresponding equilibrium solutions. The model predicts both separating and pooling equilibria, in which signaling does and does not occur respectively. We observed both kinds of equilibria in subjects and found that, in line with model predictions, the propensity of signaling decreased with increasing signaling costs and decreasing uncertainty on the part of the receiver. Our study demonstrates that signaling games, which have previously been applied to economic decision-making and animal communication, provide a framework for human signaling behavior arising during sensorimotor interactions in continuous and dynamic environments.

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 Dates: 2015-08
 Publication Status: Published in print
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 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.03.008
BibTex Citekey: LeibfriedGB2015
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Title: Cognition
  Other : Cognition
Source Genre: Journal
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Publ. Info: Amsterdam : Elsevier
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 141 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 73 - 86 Identifier: ISSN: 0010-0277
CoNE: https://pure.mpg.de/cone/journals/resource/954925391298