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  Single versus Multiple Randomization in Matching Mechanisms

Schmelzer, A. (2016). Single versus Multiple Randomization in Matching Mechanisms.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002A-4EA5-C Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002C-A449-8
Genre: Paper

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 Creators:
Schmelzer, André1, Author
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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Free keywords: market design, school choice, mechanism design, experiment, deferred acceptance algorithm, randomization, tie-breaking
 JEL: C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
 JEL: C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
 JEL: D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
 JEL: D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
 Abstract: This paper experimentally studies an essential institutional feature of matching markets: Randomization of allocation priorities. I compare single and multiple randomization in the student assignment problem with ties. The Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm is employed after indifferences in school priorities are resolved by either random procedure. The main result is that a significant fraction of individuals prefers multiple to single randomization, although both are equivalent in expectation. Multiple randomization is perceived to be fairer. One theoretical explanation is the failure to disregard compound lotteries. These results show that random procedures are not inherently neutral with respect to preferences and fairness perceptions.

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 Dates: 2017-032016
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: 38
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2016/08
 Degree: -

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