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  Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems

Bade, S. (2016). Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems. Journal of Economic Theory, 165, 257-262.

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 Creators:
Bade, Sophie1, Author              
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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Free keywords: Random matching mechanism, Non-bossy, Group-strategyproof, Random serial dictatorship
 JEL: C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
 Abstract: No group-strategyproof and ex-post Pareto optimal random matching mechanism treats equals equally. Every mechanism that arises out of the randomization over a set of non-bossy and strategyproof mechanisms is non-bossy. Random serial dictatorship, which arises out of a randomization over all deterministic serial dictatorships is non-bossy but not group-strategyproof.

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 Dates: 2016
 Publication Status: Published in print
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 Rev. Type: Peer
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Title: Journal of Economic Theory
Source Genre: Journal
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 165 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 257 - 262 Identifier: -