English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
  Pareto-Optimal Matching Allocation Mechanisms for Boundedly Rational Agents

Bade, S. (2016). Pareto-Optimal Matching Allocation Mechanisms for Boundedly Rational Agents. Social Choice and Welfare, 47(3), 501-510. doi:10.1007/s00355-016-0974-z.

Item is

Files

show Files

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Bade, Sophie1, Author              
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: -
 Abstract: Is the Pareto optimality of matching mechanisms robust to the introduction of boundedly rational behavior? To address this question I define a restrictive and a permissive notion of Pareto optimality and consider the large set of hierarchical exchange mechanisms which contains serial dictatorship as well as Gale’s top trading cycles. Fix a housing problem with boundedly rational agents and a hierarchical exchange mechanism. Consider the set of matchings that arise with all possible assignments of agents to initial endowments in the given mechanism. I show that this set is nested between the sets of Pareto optima according to the restrictive and the permissive notion. These containment relations are generally strict, even when deviations from rationality are minimal. In a similar vein, minimal deviations from rationality suffice for the set of outcomes of Gale’s top trading cycles with all possible initial endowments to differ from the set of outcomes of serial dictatorship with all possible orders of agents as dictators. © 2016 The Author(s)

Details

show
hide
Language(s):
 Dates: 2016-07-022016
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: Peer
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0974-z
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source 1

show
hide
Title: Social Choice and Welfare
Source Genre: Journal
 Creator(s):
Affiliations:
Publ. Info: -
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 47 (3) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 501 - 510 Identifier: -