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  A Must Lie Situation: Avoiding Giving Negative Feedback

Gneezy, U., Gravert, C., Saccardo, S., & Tausch, F. (2017). A Must Lie Situation: Avoiding Giving Negative Feedback. Games and Economic Behavior, 102, 445-454.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002B-146C-A Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002C-AEDD-E
Genre: Journal Article

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 Creators:
Gneezy, Uri, Author
Gravert, Christina, Author
Saccardo, Silvia, Author
Tausch, Franziska1, Author              
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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Free keywords: Lying, feedback, overconfidence, updating, laboratory experiment
 JEL: D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
 JEL: C91
 JEL: D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
 Abstract: We examine under what conditions people provide accurate feedback to others. We use feedback regarding attractiveness, a trait people care about, and for which objective information is hard to obtain. Our results show that people avoid giving accurate face-to-face feedback to less attractive individuals, even if lying in this context comes at a monetary cost to both the person who gives the feedback and the receiver. A substantial increase of these costs does not increase the accuracy of feedback. However, when feedback is provided anonymously, the aversion to giving negative feedback is reduced.

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 Dates: 20172017
 Publication Status: Published in print
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 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: Peer
 Identifiers: -
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Title: Games and Economic Behavior
Source Genre: Journal
 Creator(s):
Affiliations:
Publ. Info: -
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 102 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 445 - 454 Identifier: -