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  A Must Lie Situation: Avoiding Giving Negative Feedback

Gneezy, U., Gravert, C., Saccardo, S., & Tausch, F. (2017). A Must Lie Situation: Avoiding Giving Negative Feedback. Games and Economic Behavior, 102, 445-454.

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externe Referenz:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2800820 (beliebiger Volltext)
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externe Referenz:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.008 (beliebiger Volltext)
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Urheber

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 Urheber:
Gneezy, Uri, Autor
Gravert, Christina, Autor
Saccardo, Silvia, Autor
Tausch, Franziska1, Autor           
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

Inhalt

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Schlagwörter: Lying, feedback, overconfidence, updating, laboratory experiment
 JEL: D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
 JEL: C91
 JEL: D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
 Zusammenfassung: We examine under what conditions people provide accurate feedback to others. We use feedback regarding attractiveness, a trait people care about, and for which objective information is hard to obtain. Our results show that people avoid giving accurate face-to-face feedback to less attractive individuals, even if lying in this context comes at a monetary cost to both the person who gives the feedback and the receiver. A substantial increase of these costs does not increase the accuracy of feedback. However, when feedback is provided anonymously, the aversion to giving negative feedback is reduced.

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 Datum: 20172017
 Publikationsstatus: Erschienen
 Seiten: -
 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
 Inhaltsverzeichnis: -
 Art der Begutachtung: Expertenbegutachtung
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Titel: Games and Economic Behavior
Genre der Quelle: Zeitschrift
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Affiliations:
Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
Seiten: - Band / Heft: 102 Artikelnummer: - Start- / Endseite: 445 - 454 Identifikator: -