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  Who pays to win again? The joy of winning in contest experiments

Herbst, L. (2016). Who pays to win again? The joy of winning in contest experiments. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, No. 2016-6.

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externe Referenz:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2766934 (beliebiger Volltext)
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 Urheber:
Herbst, Luisa1, Autor           
Affiliations:
1Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society, ou_830552              

Inhalt

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Schlagwörter: Bidding, contest, desire to win, effort, experiment, emotions, joy of winning, love of winning, overexpenditure
 Zusammenfassung: In contest experiments, overbidding is a widely observed phenomenon. One common explanation for overbidding is that winning in itself yields utility, termed the joy of winning. However, the joy of winning is difficult to observe and to quantify. This paper develops a novel, incentivized way to measure the individual-specific joy of winning as well as the frustration of losing in a Tullock lottery contest. We find that the willingness to pay for a restart of the contest differs between winners and losers. Compared to a theoretical benchmark, winners are more satisfied and overbid for restart of the contest, while losers are less satisfied and underbid. Further, effort levels are higher in the second contest, which can be explained by selection of high effort types with a high joy of winning into the restarted contest.

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Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2016-04-19
 Publikationsstatus: Online veröffentlicht
 Seiten: 32
 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
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Titel: Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Genre der Quelle: Reihe
 Urheber:
Affiliations:
Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
Seiten: - Band / Heft: No. 2016-6 Artikelnummer: - Start- / Endseite: - Identifikator: -