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  On the Incentive Effects of Sample Size in Monitoring Agents - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

Avrahami, J., Güth, W., Kareev, Y., & Uske, T. (2017). On the Incentive Effects of Sample Size in Monitoring Agents - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis. German Economic Review, 18(1), 91-98.

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Item Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002C-5885-A Version Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002C-5886-8
Genre: Journal Article

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 Creators:
Avrahami, Judith, Author
Güth, Werner1, Author           
Kareev, Yaakov, Author
Uske, Tobias, Author
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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Free keywords: incentives, monitoring, stochastic production technology, tournament, uncertainty
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 Dates: 2017
 Publication Status: Issued
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 Rev. Type: Peer
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Title: German Economic Review
Source Genre: Journal
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 18 (1) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 91 - 98 Identifier: -