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  The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information

Nöldeke, G., & Peña, J. (2016). The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information. Games and economic behavior, 99, 71-81. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.016.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002D-1F9A-3 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002D-23C0-0
Genre: Journal Article

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Nöldeke, Georg, Author
Peña, Jorge1, Author              
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1Department Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445641              

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Free keywords: Costly voting; Participation games; Mixed strategy equilibrium; Polynomials in Bernstein form
 Abstract: Abstract We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information from Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). To do so, we use methods based on polynomials in Bernstein form to determine how the probability that a voter is pivotal depends on the participation probability and the number of players in the game.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2016-07-232016-07-272016
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Method: -
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.016
BibTex Citekey: Nöldeke201671
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Title: Games and economic behavior
Source Genre: Journal
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Publ. Info: Orlando, Fla. : Academic Press
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 99 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 71 - 81 Identifier: ISSN: 0899-8256
ZDB: 1002944-8
CoNE: /journals/resource/954922649140