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  Modality, probability, and mental models

Hinterecker, T., Knauff, M., & Johnson-Laird, P. (2016). Modality, probability, and mental models. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 42(10), 1606-1620. doi:10.1037/xlm0000255.

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Hinterecker, T1, 2, 3, 4, Autor           
Knauff, M, Autor           
Johnson-Laird, PN, Autor
Affiliations:
1Project group: Social & Spatial Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Max Planck Society, ou_2528706              
2Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Max Planck Society, ou_1497794              
3Project group: Motion Perception & Simulation, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Max Planck Society, ou_2528705              
4Department Human Perception, Cognition and Action, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Max Planck Society, ou_1497797              

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 Zusammenfassung: We report 3 experiments investigating novel sorts of inference, such as: A or B or both. Therefore, possibly (A and B). Where the contents were sensible assertions, for example, Space tourism will achieve widespread popularity in the next 50 years or advances in material science will lead to the development of antigravity materials in the next 50 years, or both. Most participants accepted the inferences as valid, though they are invalid in modal logic and in probabilistic logic too. But, the theory of mental models predicts that individuals should accept them. In contrast, inferences of this sort—A or B but not both. Therefore, A or B or both—are both logically valid and probabilistically valid. Yet, as the model theory also predicts, most reasoners rejected them. The participants’ estimates of probabilities showed that their inferences tended not to be based on probabilistic validity, but that they did rate acceptable conclusions as more probable than unacceptable conclusions. We discuss the implications of the results for current theories of reasoning.

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 Datum: 2016-10
 Publikationsstatus: Erschienen
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 Identifikatoren: DOI: 10.1037/xlm0000255
BibTex Citekey: HintereckerKJ2016
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Titel: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
Genre der Quelle: Zeitschrift
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Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: Washington, D.C. : American Psychological Association (PsycARTICLES)
Seiten: - Band / Heft: 42 (10) Artikelnummer: - Start- / Endseite: 1606 - 1620 Identifikator: ISSN: 0278-7393
CoNE: https://pure.mpg.de/cone/journals/resource/954927606766