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  An Instrumenting Compiler for Enforcing Confidentiality in Low-Level Code

Brahmakshatriya, A., Kedia, P., McKee, D. P., Bhatu, P., Garg, D., Lal, A., et al. (2017). An Instrumenting Compiler for Enforcing Confidentiality in Low-Level Code. Retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1711.11396.

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Item Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0000-AC98-3 Version Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0000-AC99-2
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arXiv:1711.11396.pdf (Preprint), 775KB
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 Creators:
Brahmakshatriya, Ajay1, Author
Kedia, Piyus1, Author
McKee, Derrick Paul1, Author
Bhatu, Pratik1, Author
Garg, Deepak2, Author           
Lal, Akash1, Author
Rastogi, Aseem1, Author
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1External Organizations, ou_persistent22              
2Group D. Garg, Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Max Planck Society, ou_2105289              

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Free keywords: Computer Science, Programming Languages, cs.PL
 Abstract: We present an instrumenting compiler for enforcing data confidentiality in low-level applications (e.g. those written in C) in the presence of an active adversary. In our approach, the programmer marks secret data by writing lightweight annotations on top-level definitions in the source code. The compiler then uses a static flow analysis coupled with efficient runtime instrumentation, a custom memory layout, and custom control-flow integrity checks to prevent data leaks even in the presence of low-level attacks. We have implemented our scheme as part of the LLVM compiler. We evaluate it on the SPEC micro-benchmarks for performance, and on larger, real-world applications (including OpenLDAP, which is around 300KLoC) for programmer overhead required to restructure the application when protecting the sensitive data such as passwords. We find that performance overheads introduced by our instrumentation are moderate (average 12% on SPEC), and the programmer effort to port OpenLDAP is only about 160 LoC.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2017-11-302017-12-012017
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: 14 p.
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: arXiv: 1711.11396
URI: http://arxiv.org/abs/1711.11396
 Degree: -

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