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  “Betting on nature” or “betting on others”: Anti-coordination induces uniquely high levels of entropy

Chierchia, G., Nagel, R., & Coricelli, G. (2018). “Betting on nature” or “betting on others”: Anti-coordination induces uniquely high levels of entropy. Scientific Reports, 8: 3514. doi:10.1038/s41598-018-21962-1.

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 Creators:
Chierchia, Gabriele1, 2, Author              
Nagel, Rosemarie3, Author
Coricelli, Giorgio2, 4, Author
Affiliations:
1Department Social Neuroscience, MPI for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Max Planck Society, ou_634552              
2Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Mattarello, Italy, ou_persistent22              
3Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA), University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain, ou_persistent22              
4Department of Economics, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA, ou_persistent22              

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 Abstract: Uncertainty in the form of risk or ambiguity can arise from the interaction with nature and other players, while strategic uncertainty arises only in interactions with others. Here, we systematically compare binary decisions between a safe option and a potentially higher paying but uncertain option in four experimental conditions with the same potential monetary outcomes: coordination vs. anti coordination games, as well as risky and ambiguous lotteries. In each condition, we progressively increase the value of the safe option and measure subjects’ certainty equivalents (i.e., the specific safe payoff-threshold that makes a subject indifferent between the two options). We find that anti-coordination games and ambiguous lotteries elicit equally high aversion to uncertainty, relative to the other domains. In spite of this similarity, we find that subjects alternate between the safe and uncertain options much more frequently, thus displaying higher entropy, under anti-coordination relative to any of the other environments. These differences are predicted by theories of recursive reasoning in strategic games (e.g., thinking what others think we think etc.). Indeed, this can occur when interacting with intentional counterparts, but not with nature.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2017-07-142018-02-082018-02-23
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: -
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 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: Peer
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1038/s41598-018-21962-1
PMID: 29476090
PMC: PMC5824818
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Project name : Transfer Learning within and between brains / TRANSFER-LEARNING
Grant ID : 617629
Funding program : Funding Programme 7
Funding organization : European Commission (EC)

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Title: Scientific Reports
  Abbreviation : Sci. Rep.
Source Genre: Journal
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Publ. Info: London, UK : Nature Publishing Group
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 8 Sequence Number: 3514 Start / End Page: - Identifier: ISSN: 2045-2322
CoNE: https://pure.mpg.de/cone/journals/resource/2045-2322