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  Debarment and Collusion in Procurement Auctions

Cerrone, C., Hermstrüwer, Y., & Robalo, P. (2018). Debarment and Collusion in Procurement Auctions.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0001-34B6-7 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0005-AD68-4
Genre: Paper

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 Creators:
Cerrone, Claudia1, Author              
Hermstrüwer, Yoan1, Author              
Robalo, Pedro1, Author              
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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Free keywords: debarment, collusion, procurement auctions, sanctions
 JEL: C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
 JEL: D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
 JEL: D44 - Auctions
 JEL: K21 - Antitrust Law
 JEL: K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
 Abstract: This article presents the first experiment exploring the impact of debarments - the exclusion of colluding bidders - on collusion in procurement auctions. We find that debarments and their most common alternative, fines, reduce collusion and bids relative to a market with no sanction. The deterrent effect of debarments increases in their length. However, shorter debarments reduce efficiency and increase the bids of non-debarred bidders. This suggests that debarments that are too lenient may trigger tacit collusion among the bidders who remain in the market, thereby facilitating the very behavior they aim to deter.

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 Dates: 2020-02-192018
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Discussion Paper 2018/5
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2018/05
 Degree: -

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