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  Compliance in teams – Implications of joint decisions and shared consequences

Lohse, T., & Simon, S. A. (2021). Compliance in teams – Implications of joint decisions and shared consequences. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 94: 101745. doi:10.1016/j.socec.2021.101745.

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Genre: Zeitschriftenartikel

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externe Referenz:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3184169 (Preprint)
Beschreibung:
Also published as: Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-3
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 Urheber:
Lohse, Tim1, Autor
Simon, Sven A.2, Autor           
Affiliations:
1External Organizations, ou_persistent22              
2Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society, ou_830552              

Inhalt

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Schlagwörter: Compliance, Team decision, Shared liability, Audit, Communication, Laboratory experiment
 Zusammenfassung: Are teams more prone toward non-compliance with laws and regulations than single individuals? We investigate into two key determinants of teams’ compliance behavior: Deciding jointly as a dyad, which allows deferring one’s own moral responsibility onto the team partner, from sharing the liability for gains and losses of collusive behavior. In our laboratory tax compliance experiment, teams are substantially less compliant than individuals are. Shared, as opposed to individual, liability leads to a large drop in compliance. In contrast, whether subjects make their decisions alone or together does hardly influence the overall compliance rate. When coordinating their compliance decision teams predominately discuss the risk of being caught in an audit but hardly moral concerns.

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Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2021
 Publikationsstatus: Erschienen
 Seiten: -
 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
 Inhaltsverzeichnis: -
 Art der Begutachtung: -
 Identifikatoren: DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2021.101745
 Art des Abschluß: -

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Titel: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Genre der Quelle: Zeitschrift
 Urheber:
Affiliations:
Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
Seiten: - Band / Heft: 94 Artikelnummer: 101745 Start- / Endseite: - Identifikator: ZDB: 2769607-8