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  Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain

Becks, L., & Milinski, M. (2019). Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain. Nature Communications, 10: 783. doi:10.1038/s41467-019-08671-7.

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 Urheber:
Becks, Lutz1, Autor           
Milinski, Manfred2, Autor           
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1External, ou_persistent22              
2Emeritus Group Milinski, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_2591693              

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 Zusammenfassung: Cooperative strategies are predicted for repeated social interactions. The recently described Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies enforce the partner’s cooperation because the ‘generous’ ZD players help their cooperative partners while ‘extortionate’ ZD players exploit their partners’ cooperation. Partners may accede to extortion because it pays them to do so, but the partner can sabotage his own and his extortioner’s score by defecting to discipline the extortioner. Thus, extortion is predicted to turn into generous and disappear. Here, we show with human volunteers that an additional monetary incentive (bonus) paid to the finally competitively superior player maintains extortion. Unexpectedly, extortioners refused to become disciplined, thus forcing partners to accede. Occasional opposition reduced the extortioners’ gain so that using extortion paid off only because of the bonus. With no bonus incentive, players used the generous ZD strategy. Our findings suggest that extortion strategies can prevail when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain.

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Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2019-01-182018-08-312019-01-242019-02-152019
 Publikationsstatus: Erschienen
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 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
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 Identifikatoren: DOI: 10.1038/s41467-019-08671-7
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Titel: Nature Communications
  Kurztitel : Nat. Commun.
Genre der Quelle: Zeitschrift
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Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: London : Nature Publishing Group
Seiten: - Band / Heft: 10 Artikelnummer: 783 Start- / Endseite: - Identifikator: ISSN: 2041-1723
CoNE: https://pure.mpg.de/cone/journals/resource/2041-1723