English
 
User Manual Privacy Policy Disclaimer Contact us
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
  Inherited Institutions: Cooperation in the Light of Democratic Legitimacy

Langenbach, P., & Tausch, F. (2019). Inherited Institutions: Cooperation in the Light of Democratic Legitimacy. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 35(2): ewz004, pp. 364-393.

Item is

Basic

show hide
Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0003-BCE6-6 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0004-645F-2
Genre: Journal Article

Files

show Files

Locators

show
hide
Locator:
https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewz004 (Any fulltext)
Description:
-

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Langenbach, Pascal1, Author              
Tausch, Franziska1, Author              
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: Endogeneity, Voting, Institutions, Social dilemma, Public good, Inherited rules
 JEL: C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
 JEL: D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
 JEL: D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
 JEL: D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
 JEL: H41 - Public Goods
 Abstract: We experimentally investigate whether the procedural history of a sanctioning institution affects cooperation in a social dilemma. Subjects inherit the institutional setting from a previous generation of subjects who either decided on the implementation of the institution democratically by majority vote or were exogenously assigned a setting. In order to isolate the impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical evidence, we observe that in the starting generation cooperation is higher (lower) with a democratically chosen (rejected) institution, as compared to the corresponding, randomly imposed setting. In the second generation, we find no positive effect of the democratic procedural history on cooperation when the institution is implemented. Yet, the vote-based rejection of the institution leads to (marginally) less cooperation in the second generation.

Details

show
hide
Language(s):
 Dates: 20192019
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: Peer
 Identifiers: -
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source 1

show
hide
Title: The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Source Genre: Journal
 Creator(s):
Affiliations:
Publ. Info: -
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 35 (2) Sequence Number: ewz004 Start / End Page: 364 - 393 Identifier: -