ausblenden:
Schlagwörter:
matching markets, school choice, transparency, fairness, law and
market design
JEL:
C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
JEL:
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
JEL:
D47 - Market Design
JEL:
I20 - General
JEL:
K10 - General
Zusammenfassung:
This article explores the impact of procedural information on the behavior of applicants under two of the most commonly used school admissions procedures: the Gale-Shapley mechanism and the Boston mechanism. In a lab experiment, I compare the impact of information about the mechanism, information about individually optimal application strategies, and information about both. I find that strategic and full information increase truth-telling and stability under the Gale-Shapley mechanism. Under the Boston mechanism, however, the adoption of equilibrium strategies remains unaffected. Contrary to prevailing assumptions in matching theory, I show that the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These results underscore the importance of procedural information and suggest that eliminating justified envy may not be a sucient condition of fairness.
