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  Transparency and Fairness in School Choice Mechanisms

Hermstrüwer, Y. (2019). Transparency and Fairness in School Choice Mechanisms.

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 Creators:
Hermstrüwer, Yoan1, Author              
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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Free keywords: matching markets, school choice, transparency, fairness, law and market design
 JEL: C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
 JEL: C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
 JEL: D47 - Market Design
 JEL: I20 - General
 JEL: K10 - General
 Abstract: This article explores the impact of procedural information on the behavior of applicants under two of the most commonly used school admissions procedures: the Gale-Shapley mechanism and the Boston mechanism. In a lab experiment, I compare the impact of information about the mechanism, information about individually optimal application strategies, and information about both. I find that strategic and full information increase truth-telling and stability under the Gale-Shapley mechanism. Under the Boston mechanism, however, the adoption of equilibrium strategies remains unaffected. Contrary to prevailing assumptions in matching theory, I show that the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These results underscore the importance of procedural information and suggest that eliminating justified envy may not be a sucient condition of fairness.

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 Dates: 2019-08-08
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Discussion Paper 2019/11
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2019/11
 Degree: -

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