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  Clientelism and Dominance: Evidence from Turkey

Arslantaş, D. (2019). Clientelism and Dominance: Evidence from Turkey. PhD Thesis, Universität zu Köln, Köln.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0004-C16F-6 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0007-2B51-E
Genre: Thesis

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 Creators:
Arslantaş, Düzgün1, Author              
Affiliations:
1International Max Planck Research School on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_1214550              

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Free keywords: clientelism, dominance, AKP
 Abstract: The aim of this thesis is to develop a number of theoretical ideas about the emergence of the predominant party system in Turkey under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government from 2002 to 2015. A predominant party system emerges when a party wins at least three elections in a row by more than a 10 percent margin and forms the government alone. I argue that the expansion of clientelist networks under the AKP government has twofold ramifications, which in turn have reproduced the cycle of dominance. First, it strengthened voters’ partisan identification. Second, it changed voters’ ideology such that they became less resistant to or even supportive of neoliberal reforms. The conclusions are based on fieldwork in one of the poorest and most densely populated districts of Istanbul, Bağcılar.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2019-09-092019
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: xii, 198
 Publishing info: Köln : Universität zu Köln
 Table of Contents: Tables, Figures, and Photos
ABSTRACT
1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION*
1.1. Comparative cases
1.2. Method and fieldwork
1.3. Contributions and output
1.4. Plan
2. CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK*
2.1. The party and the party systems
2.2. The dominant party and the predominant party system
2.3. Predominant party systems versus hegemonic party systems
2.4. Predominant party systems and political regimes
3. CHAPTER THREE: THEORY
3.1. Institutional theories
3.1.1. Gerrymandering
3.2. Social cleavage theory
3.3. Decision-theoretic model
3.4. Performance legitimacy theory
3.5. Resource theory
3.5.1. Clientelism
3.5.2. Clientelism in Turkish politics: The past
3.5.3. Clientelism under AKP governments
4. CHAPTER FOUR: PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE IN TURKEY
4.1. Defining party system change
4.2. 1923‒1950: One-party authoritarianism
4.3. 1950‒60: From the predominant party system to the hegemonic party system
4.4. 1961‒1980: Polarized pluralism driven by left-right cleavage
4.5. 1983‒2002: Polarized pluralism driven by ethnic and religious cleavages
4.6. 2002‒2015: Predominant party system
5. CHAPTER FIVE: AKP
5.1. The rise and fall of Islamist politics in Turkey
5.2. AKP
5.2.1. AKP’s flirtation with the global order: neoliberalism at the climax
5.2.2. AKP and political Islam: Cyclical moderation
5.3. Elections
5.3.1. 2002–2007: The good old days
5.3.2. 2007–2011: Consolidation of power
5.3.3. 2011–2015: The “New Turkey”
5.3.4. From June to November 2015: The fall and the rise of the AKP
6. CHAPTER SIX: FIELDWORK
6.1. Method
6.2. Scope and significance
6.3. Case selection: Bağcılar
6.3.1. Parties and elections in Bağcılar
6.4. From the ‘social democrats’ to the ‘Islamists’: Clientelism during the 1990s
6.5. The demand side: the poor
6.6. The supply side: Patrons
6.6.1. Party
6.6.2. Municipality
6.6.3. Leader
6.6.4. Religious groups, vaqfs and loyal businessmen
6.7. The content of clientelist exchange
6.8. Exclusion
6.9. Deterring exit: monitoring and punishment
6.10. Swing vs. core voters
6.11. Causal mechanisms
6.11.1. Strengthening partisan identification
6.11.2. Change in ideology
7. CHAPTER SEVEN: COMPARISON
7.1. Mexico
7.2. Taiwan
7.3. India
7.4. Japan
8. CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION
APPENDIX I: Interview guide
APPENDIX II: The list of interviews
REFERENCES
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-100050
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/10005
 Degree: PhD

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