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  Winners' efforts in team contests

Serena, M. (2019). Winners' efforts in team contests. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, No. 2019-03.

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https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338359 (Preprint)
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 Urheber:
Serena, Marco1, Autor           
Affiliations:
1Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society, ou_830552              

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Schlagwörter: team contest, winners' efforts, temporal structures
 Zusammenfassung: The conventional wisdom for individualistic dynamic contests is that expected total effort is larger in a simultaneous than in a sequential contest, as only the latter is affected by the "discouragement" effect. In contrast, all temporal structures of team contests yield the same expected total effort, as shown by Fu, Lu, and Pan (2015)'s remarkable neutrality result. Rather than expected total effort, we analyze the consequences of different temporal structures of team contests on expected winners' efforts, a natural objective in a number of applications such as R&D races, elections, and sports. We show that, among all possible temporal structures, expected winners' efforts are maximized by a fully simultaneous and minimized by a fully sequential contest. This result thus parallels the conventional wisdom for individualistic contests. And the neutrality of expected total effort ceases to hold as soon as winners' and losers' efforts are not equally valuable.

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Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2019-02-21
 Publikationsstatus: Online veröffentlicht
 Seiten: 23
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Titel: Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Genre der Quelle: Reihe
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Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
Seiten: - Band / Heft: No. 2019-03 Artikelnummer: - Start- / Endseite: - Identifikator: -