English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
 
 
DownloadE-Mail
  Primary Dealer Systems in the European Union

Preunkert, J. (2020). Primary Dealer Systems in the European Union. MaxPo Discussion Paper, 20/1.

Item is

Files

show Files
hide Files
:
mpifg_mpdp20_1.pdf (Any fulltext), 696KB
Name:
mpifg_mpdp20_1.pdf
Description:
Full text open access
OA-Status:
Visibility:
Public
MIME-Type / Checksum:
application/pdf / [MD5]
Technical Metadata:
Copyright Date:
-
Copyright Info:
-
License:
-

Locators

show
hide
Description:
Full text
OA-Status:

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Preunkert, Jenny1, Author
Affiliations:
1University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany, ou_persistent22              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: Europe, financial markets, government debt market, hierarchy, international competition, sociology; Europe, marchés financiers, marché de la dette publique, hiérarchie, concurrence international, sociologie
 Abstract: States require money to function and therefore every government has to continuously raise new funds. On the financial markets, governments cannot be sure that auctions of their debt will be sufficiently attractive to financial investors, which is why governments usually enter into cooperative agreements with selected banks. The best known and most widespread form of cooperation is the primary dealer system. Primary dealers are banks that agree to participate regularly in government debt auctions and to act as formalized market makers on government debt markets. The article analyzes European primary dealer systems and asks why banks are willing to participate in these systems. I will show that both domestic and foreign banks use their status as primary dealers to build long-term relationships with one or more European governments and to gain an advantage on the global stage. In Bourdieu’s terms, primary dealer banks use their financial capital to accumulate social and symbolic capital.
 Abstract: Pour couvrir le besoin de financement des États, les gouvernements doivent en permanence lever de nouveaux fonds. Mais les gouvernements ne sont pas sûrs qu’une mise aux enchères directe de leur dette sur les marchés financiers soit suffisamment attractive pour attirer des investisseurs. C’est pourquoi ils passent des accords de coopération avec des banques qu’ils sélectionnent. La forme de coopération la plus répandue est le système de négociant principal par lequel les banques acceptent de participer régulièrement aux enchères de la dette publique, comme teneurs de marché. Cet article analyse le système de négociant principal européen et interroge les motivations des banques qui y participent. J’y démontre que les banques nationales et étrangères utilisent leur condition de négociant principal pour établir des relations à long terme avec un ou plusieurs gouvernements et acquérir un avantage au niveau mondial. En termes boursieusiens, les banques agissant en tant que négociant principal utilisent leur capital financier pour accumuler du capital social et du capital symbolique.

Details

show
hide
Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2020-012020
 Publication Status: Issued
 Pages: iv, 21
 Publishing info: Paris : MaxPo
 Table of Contents: 1 Introduction
2 Intermediary groups in primary dealer systems
3 The global financial market as a weakly institutionalized field
4 Research design
5 The trade-off between financial capital and social and symbolic capital
6 Different strategies among primary dealers: national experts,
global players, and transnational specialists
National experts
Global players
Transnational specialists
7 Conclusion
References
 Rev. Type: Internal
 Identifiers: -
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source 1

show
hide
Title: MaxPo Discussion Paper
Source Genre: Series
 Creator(s):
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo), MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, Editor              
Affiliations:
-
Publ. Info: -
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 20/1 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: - Identifier: ISSN: 2196-6508
ISSN: 2197-3075