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  Restraining Free-Riders: The Effects of Actor Types and Decision Rules in the Public Goods Game

Sauermann, J., & Glassmann, U. (2014). Restraining Free-Riders: The Effects of Actor Types and Decision Rules in the Public Goods Game. Rationality and Society, 26(3), 290-319. doi:10.1177/1043463114533073.

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 Creators:
Sauermann, Jan1, 2, Author           
Glassmann, Ulrich3, Author
Affiliations:
1International Max Planck Research School on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_1214550              
2University of Cologne, Germany, ou_persistent22              
3University of Konstanz, Germany, ou_persistent22              

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Free keywords: Cooperation, decision-making rule, group behavior, laboratory experiment, social dilemma
 Abstract: Many experiments comparing individual and group behavior find that groups behave more egoistically than individuals. However, most of these studies do not control for the influence of within-group decision-making rules that might have an important impact on group behavior. In this article, we report findings from laboratory experiments comparing individual and group behavior in a public goods game. We find that rather than cooperation levels differing between individuals and groups per se, the intragroup decision-making rule has an influence on the cooperativeness of groups. Groups decide either by majority or unanimity rule. While groups deciding by majority rule reach roughly the same level of cooperation as individuals, groups deciding by unanimity rule contribute significantly lower amounts to the public good.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2014-07-222014
 Publication Status: Issued
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 Table of Contents: Introduction
Theoretical assumptions about the cooperativeness of individuals and groups
Experimental design and procedure
Experimental results
Conclusion
Acknowledgements
Notes
References
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1177/1043463114533073
 Degree: -

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Title: Rationality and Society
Source Genre: Journal
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 26 (3) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 290 - 319 Identifier: ISSN: 1043-4631
ISSN: 1461-7358