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  Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments: Evidence from a natural field experiment

Kassis, M., Schmidt, S. L., Schreyer, D., & Sutter, M. (2021). Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments: Evidence from a natural field experiment. Games and Economic Behavior, 126, 278-287. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.006.

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 Urheber:
Kassis, Mark, Autor
Schmidt, Sascha L., Autor
Schreyer, Dominik, Autor
Sutter, Matthias1, Autor           
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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Schlagwörter: Dynamic tournament, sports professionals, psychological pressure, value of decision rights, penalty shoot-outs, behavioral economics
 JEL: C93 - Field Experiments
 JEL: D00 - General
 JEL: D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
 JEL: D15 - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
 JEL: Z20 - General
 Zusammenfassung: In this paper, we show that the right to determine the sequence of moves in a dynamic team tournament improves the chances of winning the contest. Because studying dynamic team tournaments – like R&D races – with interim feedback is difficult with company data, we examine decisions of highly paid professionals in soccer penalty shootouts and show that teams whose captains can decide about the shooting sequence are more likely to win the shootout. So, managerial decisions matter for outcomes of dynamic tournaments and we discuss potential reasons for this finding.

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 Datum: 2021-01-132021-01-182021-03
 Publikationsstatus: Erschienen
 Seiten: -
 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
 Inhaltsverzeichnis: -
 Art der Begutachtung: Expertenbegutachtung
 Identifikatoren: DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.006
 Art des Abschluß: -

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Titel: Games and Economic Behavior
Genre der Quelle: Zeitschrift
 Urheber:
Affiliations:
Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
Seiten: - Band / Heft: 126 Artikelnummer: - Start- / Endseite: 278 - 287 Identifikator: -