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  Incomplete-information games in large populations with anonymity

Hellwig, M. F. (2022). Incomplete-information games in large populations with anonymity. Theoretical Economics, 17, 461-506.

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Item Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0008-26B0-6 Version Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000C-B9AF-F
Genre: Journal Article

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4066-33014-1-PB.pdf (Publisher version), 472KB
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 Creators:
Hellwig, Martin F.1, Author           
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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Free keywords: Incomplete-information games, large populations, belief functions, common priors, exchangeability, conditional independence, conditional exact law of large numbers
 JEL: C70 - General
 JEL: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
 JEL: D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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 Dates: 2021-032021-03-222022-01
 Publication Status: Issued
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 Rev. Type: Peer
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Title: Theoretical Economics
Source Genre: Journal
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 17 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 461 - 506 Identifier: -