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  Between Governability and Legitimacy: The ECB and Structural Reforms

Braun, B., Di Carlo, D., Diessner, S., & Düsterhöft, M. (2021). Between Governability and Legitimacy: The ECB and Structural Reforms. SocArXiv. doi:10.31235/osf.io/dp3nv.

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Genre: Preprint
Alternativer Titel : Planning Laissez-Faire: Supranational Central Banking and Structural Reforms

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externe Referenz:
https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/dp3nv (Preprint)
Beschreibung:
Full text via SocArXiv
OA-Status:
Keine Angabe
externe Referenz:
https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000E-7E0E-7 (Ergänzendes Material)
Beschreibung:
New source: Braun, Benjamin, Di Carlo, Donato, & Diessner, Sebastian (2022). Planning Laissez-Faire: Supranational Central Banking and Structural Reforms. Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 32(3), 707-716.
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 Urheber:
Braun, Benjamin1, Autor           
Di Carlo, Donato2, 3, Autor           
Diessner, Sebastian3, 4, Autor
Düsterhöft, Maximilian5, Autor
Affiliations:
1Soziologie des Marktes, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_1214556              
2Politische Ökonomie der europäischen Integration, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_1856345              
3European University Institute, Florence, Italy, ou_persistent22              
4London School of Economics, UK, ou_persistent22              
5Faculty of Business and Economics, Technische Universität Dresden, Germany, ou_persistent22              

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Schlagwörter: European Central Bank, euro area, monetary integration, labor market policy, social protection
 Zusammenfassung: How do European institutions affect the tension between economic globalization and social protection? While scholars have focused on the legal and economic logics of European integration embodied by the European Court of Justice and the Commission, much less is known about the monetary logic of integration embodied by the European Central Bank (ECB). Although the ECB lacks the authority to intervene in labor market or social policies, we document its persistent advocacy for structural reforms between 1999 and 2014, and its subsequent silence on the topic. To explain this puzzling pattern, we draw on the rationalist variant of historical institutionalism. Based on a mixed-methods analysis of speeches, parliamentary hearings, and interviews, we show that the ECB navigated a trade-off between ungovernability and illegitimacy. To maintain monetary governability in a heterogeneous currency area, the ECB pushed for structural reforms until legitimacy concerns compelled it to reverse course.

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Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2021-03-152021-03-16
 Publikationsstatus: Online veröffentlicht
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 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
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 Identifikatoren: DOI: 10.31235/osf.io/dp3nv
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Titel: SocArXiv
Genre der Quelle: Webseite
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