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  Why Does Germany Abstain from Statutory Bargaining Extensions? Explaining the Exceptional German Erosion of Collective Wage Bargaining

Günther, W., & Höpner, M. (2022). Why Does Germany Abstain from Statutory Bargaining Extensions? Explaining the Exceptional German Erosion of Collective Wage Bargaining. Economic and Industrial Democracy, (published online January 6). doi:10.1177/0143831X211065783.

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https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X211065783 (Publisher version)
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 Creators:
Günther, Wolfgang1, Author
Höpner, Martin2, Author              
Affiliations:
1University of Leipzig, Germany, ou_persistent22              
2Politische Ökonomie der europäischen Integration, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_1856345              

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Free keywords: Employers’ associations, industrial relations, political economy, statutory bargaining extensions, wage bargaining
 Abstract: Against the European trend, German statutory collective bargaining extensions (SBEs) have decreased in the last two decades, contributing to the exceptional erosion of German wage-bargaining coverage. This article distinguishes between two liberalization dynamics: an intrasectoral dynamic that started with the introduction of employers’ association memberships outside the scope of collective agreements, and an intersectoral dynamic. The latter is the result of an abnormal German institutional feature, the veto power of the employers’ umbrella association in the committees that have to approve SBE applications. Activation of this veto enabled employers to promote collective bargaining erosion in sectors other than their own, in order to contain cost pressures. This intersectoral liberalization dynamic has been part of Germany’s transition into an asymmetrically export-driven growth regime and could be stopped by means of political reforms.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2022-01-06
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: 21
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: Introduction
Competing explanations
The sectoral distribution of German SBEs
The cumulation of shocks in the 1990s
A new path: OT memberships
The path not chosen
The BDA exercises its veto power
An intersectoral liberalization dynamic
Conclusion
Acknowledgements
Notes
References
 Rev. Type: Peer
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1177/0143831X211065783
 Degree: -

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Title: Economic and Industrial Democracy
Source Genre: Journal
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: (published online January 6) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: - Identifier: ISSN: 0143-831X
ISSN: 1461-7099