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Abstract:
According to seminal utility-based theories of norm-violating and unethical behavior, the decision to lie involves trading-off the potential benefits of dishonesty against the potential costs if caught. However, even in paradigms with zero risk of sanctions, individuals do not consistently cheat. Still more strikingly, most of the few findings available from studies implementing a sanctioning system run contrary to what would be expected based on utility-based accounts of dishonesty, showing increased cheating when there is a small risk of sanctions as compared to when the risk is zero. Given the striking nature of these findings and the general scarcity of corresponding evidence, we devised a targeted empirical test of the role of sanctions for dishonest behavior. Specifically, in two experiments, we manipulated the probability (i.e., 16.7% vs. 50%) that the factual truth of one's response in a cheating paradigm is checked. In Experiment 2, we further varied the severity of sanctions for being caught cheating. Results showed that the willingness to lie strongly decreased with increasing probability of being caught as well as with increasing severity of sanctions. As such, the results clearly support the theoretical notion that external costs influence unethical behavior, in the direction implied by utility-based models.
