English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
  School Choice with Consent: An Experiment

Cerrone, C., Hermstrüwer, Y., & Kesten, O. (2022). School Choice with Consent: An Experiment.

Item is

Files

show Files

Locators

show
hide
Description:
-

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Cerrone, Claudia1, Author              
Hermstrüwer, Yoan1, Author              
Kesten, Onur, Author
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm, school choice, consent, default rules, law
 JEL: C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
 JEL: C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
 JEL: D47 - Market Design
 JEL: I20 - General
 JEL: K10 - General
 Abstract: Public school choice often yields student placements that are neither fair nor efficient. Kesten (2010) proposed an efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm (EADAM) that allows students to consent to waive priorities that have no effect on their assignment. In this article, we provide first experimental evidence on the performance of EADAM. We compare EADAM with the deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) and with two variants of EADAM. In the first variant, we vary the default option: students can object – rather than consent – to the priority waiver. In the second variant, the priority waiver is enforced. We find that both efficiency and truth-telling rates are substantially higher under EADAM than under DA, even though EADAM is not strategy-proof. When the priority waiver is enforced, we observe that efficiency further increases, while truth-telling rates decrease relative to the EADAM variants where students can dodge the waiver. Our results challenge the importance of strategy-proofness as a condition of truth-telling and point to a trade-off between efficiency and vulnerability to preference manipulation.

Details

show
hide
Language(s):
 Dates: 2022-02-09
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Discussion Paper 2022/2
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: -
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source

show