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  Winner’s effort maximization in large contests

Barbieri, S., & Serena, M. (2021). Winner’s effort maximization in large contests. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 96: 102512. doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102512.

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Genre: Zeitschriftenartikel

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 Urheber:
Barbieri, Stefano1, Autor
Serena, Marco2, Autor           
Affiliations:
1External Organizations, ou_persistent22              
2Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society, ou_830552              

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Schlagwörter: Large contests, Temporal structure, Winner’s effort
 Zusammenfassung: We investigate the temporal structure that maximizes the winner’s effort in large homogeneous contests. We find that the winner’s effort ranges from a lower bound of 0 to an upper bound of one third of the value of the prize, depending on the temporal structure; the upper (lower) bound is approached with an infinite number of players playing sequentially (simultaneously) in the first periods (period). Nevertheless, when the number of players is large but finite, we show that winner’s effort is maximized when all players play sequentially except in the very last period and that, within the family of such optimal temporal structures, more players play simultaneously in the very last period than sequentially in all other periods. Furthermore, out of all players, the percentage of those playing simultaneously in the very last period goes to 100% as the number of players grows larger and larger.

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Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2021-10
 Publikationsstatus: Online veröffentlicht
 Seiten: -
 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
 Inhaltsverzeichnis: -
 Art der Begutachtung: -
 Identifikatoren: DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102512
 Art des Abschluß: -

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Titel: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Genre der Quelle: Zeitschrift
 Urheber:
Affiliations:
Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: Elsevier
Seiten: - Band / Heft: 96 Artikelnummer: 102512 Start- / Endseite: - Identifikator: ISSN: 0304-4068
CoNE: https://pure.mpg.de/cone/journals/resource/954921387915