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Schlagwörter:
COVID-19, debt mutualization, eurozone, public opinion, survey experiments
Zusammenfassung:
Existing research argues that a “democratic constraint” blocks the path towards fiscal integration in the eurozone: Voters in creditor countries are fundamentally opposed to debt sharing, while voters in debtor countries are unwilling to leave the euro, which constrains national politicians. However, this literature neglects that preferences are strategically interdependent across countries and dependent on the information processed by voters. Based on two linked survey experiments in Germany and Italy, conducted at a crucial moment during the COVID-19 pandemic, we show that a majority of German voters accept debt mutualization in order to stave off a break-up of the euro as a result of Italexit. In contrast, Italian voters prefer Italexit if austerity and structural reforms are required to remain in the euro. Our experimental results thus first suggest that there is no insurmountable opposition towards debt mutualization in German public opinion and second that there is a serious risk of Italian public opinion turning against the euro if further austerity is imposed. Furthermore, they help to explain why German politicians relaxed their hostility to joint debt and agreed to the introduction of the EU’s pandemic recovery fund in 2020.
