English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
  Stalling the State: How Digital Platforms Contribute to and Profit From Delays in the Enforcement and Adoption of Regulations

Mazur, J., & Serafin, M. (2022). Stalling the State: How Digital Platforms Contribute to and Profit From Delays in the Enforcement and Adoption of Regulations. Comparative Political Studies. doi:10.1177/00104140221089651.

Item is

Files

show Files
hide Files
:
CPS_2022_Serafin.pdf (Any fulltext), 284KB
Name:
CPS_2022_Serafin.pdf
Description:
Full text open access
OA-Status:
Visibility:
Public
MIME-Type / Checksum:
application/pdf / [MD5]
Technical Metadata:
Copyright Date:
-
Copyright Info:
-
License:
-

Locators

show
hide
Locator:
https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221089651 (Publisher version)
Description:
Full text open access via publisher
OA-Status:
Hybrid

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Mazur, Joanna1, Author
Serafin, Marcin2, 3, Author           
Affiliations:
1Faculty of Management, University of Warsaw, Poland, ou_persistent22              
2Assoziierte Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_2074316              
3Institute of Philosophy and Sociology (IFiS PAN), Polish Academy of Sciences, Warschau, Poland, ou_persistent22              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: platform power, institutional drift, Uber, law enforcement, entrenchment
 Abstract: While it is often claimed that the pace of digital transformation is such that its own, often glacial changes do not allow the state to catch up, we argue that technological companies, with the help of some state actors, have been slowing the state down. To capture this phenomenon, we introduce the notion of stalling strategies. We argue that stalling strategies have allowed digital platforms to create time that they have spent generating revenue and accumulating platform power, which later protected them from state actions. Drawing on a case study of Uber in Poland and a number of shadow cases, we distinguish five stalling strategies: reinventing classifications, dragging out court proceedings, stealing the time of street-level bureaucrats, delaying new regulations, and taking time to (not) comply. By analyzing stalling strategies, this article contributes to discussions about the politics of platform capitalism, the temporality of digitalization, and institutional drift.

Details

show
hide
Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2022-06-03
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: 30
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: Introduction
Theory: Primitive Accumulation of Platform Power and Stalling Strategies
Case Selection and Data
Stalling Strategies
Beyond the Particular Case: Stalling to Accumulate Platform Power, Stalling to Protect It
Conclusion: Platform Power as a Fait Accompli
Acknowledgements
Notes
References
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1177/00104140221089651
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source 1

show
hide
Title: Comparative Political Studies
Source Genre: Journal
 Creator(s):
Affiliations:
Publ. Info: -
Pages: - Volume / Issue: - Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: - Identifier: ISSN: 0010-4140
ISSN: 1552-3829