Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: Theoretical 
benchmark and experimental evidence

Güth, Werner; Stadler, Manfred; Zaby, Alexandra

doi:10.1007/s00182-020-00718-0

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Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: Theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence

Güth, W., Stadler, M., & Zaby, A. (2020). Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: Theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence. International Journal of Game Theory, 49, 495-524. doi:10.1007/s00182-020-00718-0.

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Item Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000C-9891-4 Version Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000C-C45A-2

Genre: Journal Article

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Creators:
Güth, Werner¹, Author
Stadler, Manfred, Author
Zaby, Alexandra, Author

Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688

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Dates: Date issued: 2020

Publication Status: Issued

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Rev. Type: Peer

Identifiers: DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00718-0

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Title: International Journal of Game Theory

Source Genre: Journal

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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 49 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 495 - 524 Identifier: -