English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
 
 
DownloadE-Mail
  Industrial Data Sharing and Data Readiness: A Law and Economics Perspective

Jorzik, N., Kirchhof, P., & Mueller-Langer, F. (2023). Industrial Data Sharing and Data Readiness: A Law and Economics Perspective. Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 23-22.

Item is

Files

show Files

Locators

show
hide
Description:
-
OA-Status:
Not specified
Locator:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09787-4 (Publisher version)
Description:
Forthcoming in: European Journal of Law and Economics
OA-Status:
Not specified

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Jorzik, Nathalie 1, Author
Kirchhof, Paljana 1, Author
Mueller-Langer, Frank2, Author           
Affiliations:
1External Organizations, ou_persistent22              
2MPI for Innovation and Competition, Max Planck Society, ou_2035292              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: Industrial data sharing, data readiness, welfare effects
 Abstract: We study the incentives and welfare properties of industrial data sharing taking into account the data (economy) readiness of companies. We differentiate between two regulatory settings. First, there is no compulsionfor companies to provide data. Companies, which also use the data for other corporate purposes, decide whether to share their data voluntarily. Second, there is a regulatory requirement on the minimum amount of data to be shared by the data provider. We assume that data sharing affects the data provider’s value of the data. The magnitude and sign of this effect have an impact on the optimal investment level of data generation and overall welfare in the different cases under study. Our results suggest that the implementation of a data-sharing policy has ambiguous welfare properties. It has positive welfare properties if (a) the data receiving firm does not pay too much for the data, (b) the data receiving firm benefits enough from the data provider’s data generating effort, and (c) the intensified competition due to data sharing is not too harmful to the data provider. In contrast, it will always have negative welfare properties if the data provider’s minimum amount of data to be shared under the policy is prohibitively high such that no data is created in the first place. Our results also suggest that a positive effect of data sharing on the data-generating company’s value of the data and its data economy readiness positively affect the incentives to share data. Finally, we find that data sharing under a data-sharing policy leads to a lower data quality if the data economy readiness of the data-generating company is too low.

Details

show
hide
Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2023-11-07
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: 28
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: -
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source 1

show
hide
Title: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper
Source Genre: Series
 Creator(s):
Affiliations:
Publ. Info: -
Pages: - Volume / Issue: No. 23-22 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: - Identifier: -