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  Sectors versus Borders: Interest Group Cleavages and Struggles over Corporate Governance in the Age of Asset Management

Voss, D. (2024). Sectors versus Borders: Interest Group Cleavages and Struggles over Corporate Governance in the Age of Asset Management. Socio-Economic Review. doi:10.1093/ser/mwad072.

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Datensatz-Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000E-3BC4-3 Versions-Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000E-AFC0-4
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 Urheber:
Voss, Dustin1, Autor           
Affiliations:
1Politische Ökonomie, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_3363015              

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Schlagwörter: corporate governance; firm strategy; Germany; institutional complementarity; power; political economy
 Zusammenfassung: Universally invested asset managers like BlackRock have established a dominant position in equity markets around the globe. While extant contributions have explored their voting behaviour and role in shaping corporate governance at the firm level, less is known about their potential to build interest coalitions with other business groups, and their leverage over state-level corporate governance institutions. This article investigates conflict over a far-reaching reform to co-determination in Germany. Qualitative content analysis of over 100 stakeholder statements yields that asset managers forge coalitions with short-term-oriented investors to abolish key tenets of corporatist institutions. However, a domestic countercoalition of financial and non-financial firms prevented momentous institutional change. This article improves our understanding of international asset managers’ preferences and highlights coalition building as a key determinant of the political power of international finance. By aligning the costs of institutional change for incumbents, corporatist institutions continue to act as shields against financialization.

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Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2024-01-09
 Publikationsstatus: Online veröffentlicht
 Seiten: 24
 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
 Inhaltsverzeichnis: 1. Introduction
2. Literature review: the power of asset managers and their role in corporate governance
3. Theoretical framework: sectors versus borders?
4. Data and methods
5. Analysis: interest factions and coalition analysis
6. Discussion and conclusion
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
References
Supplementary data
 Art der Begutachtung: Expertenbegutachtung
 Identifikatoren: DOI: 10.1093/ser/mwad072
 Art des Abschluß: -

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Titel: Socio-Economic Review
Genre der Quelle: Zeitschrift
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Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
Seiten: - Band / Heft: - Artikelnummer: - Start- / Endseite: - Identifikator: ISSN: 1475-1461
ISSN: 1475-147X