hide
Free keywords:
-
Abstract:
The boundaries of human cooperation extend beyond helping those who are related to us. Evolutionary theories of cooperation relate our ability to cooperate broadly to our ability to use information from past experiences efficiently. In this thesis, I present three theoretical studies that investigate open questions about these theories.
One theory states that one reason we are motivated to cooperate is because we expect rewards from others. However, existing models do not explain why we might be motivated to reward in the first place. In my first study, I use a model to show that reputational effects can explain why we reward cooperation. When individuals are able to learn how others have rewarded in the past, they opportunistically use this information to cooperate with only those who reward cooperation. This, in turn, incentivizes people to engage in rewarding cooperation.
Often, theoretical models of cooperation assume that individuals are equal in all aspects and that they learn to act in strategic interactions by imitating strategies of fitter individuals. In my second study, I analyze introspection dynamics, a learning process by which unequal individuals adopt strategies that are currently best suited for them.
In my final study, I explore a model that integrates the theories of direct, indirect, and generalized reciprocity in a single framework. This study aims to understand how individuals might learn to weigh different types of past information in their current cooperative decisions. With the help of evolutionary simulations, I study whether individuals prefer a mode of reciprocity when they cooperate. I find that generalized reciprocity (i.e., treating someone based on how others have treated you) undermines the emergence of cooperation. This finding indicates that the evolution of generalized reciprocity is likely independent from the evolution of the other two forms of reciprocity.
