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  Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas

Hübner, V., Staab, M., Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Kleshnina, M. (2024). Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. PNAS, 121(10): e2315558121. doi:10.1073/pnas.2315558121.

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hübner-et-al-2024-efficiency-and-resilience-of-cooperation-in-asymmetric-social-dilemmas.pdf (Publisher version), 3MB
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 Creators:
Hübner, Valentin, Author
Staab, Manuel, Author
Hilbe, Christian1, Author                 
Chatterjee, Krishnendu, Author
Kleshnina, Maria, Author
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior (Hilbe), Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_3164873              

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 Abstract: Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for cooperation in social dilemmas. The very logic of reciprocity, however, seems to require that individuals are symmetric, and that everyone has the same means to influence each others’ payoffs. Yet in many applications, individuals are asymmetric. Herein, we study the effect of asymmetry in linear public good games. Individuals may differ in their endowments (their ability to contribute to a public good) and in their productivities (how effective their contributions are). Given the individuals’ productivities, we ask which allocation of endowments is optimal for cooperation. To this end, we consider two notions of optimality. The first notion focuses on the resilience of cooperation. The respective endowment distribution ensures that full cooperation is feasible even under the most adverse conditions. The second notion focuses on efficiency. The corresponding endowment distribution maximizes group welfare. Using analytical methods, we fully characterize these two endowment distributions. This analysis reveals that both optimality notions favor some endowment inequality: More productive players ought to get higher endowments. Yet the two notions disagree on how unequal endowments are supposed to be. A focus on resilience results in less inequality. With additional simulations, we show that the optimal endowment allocation needs to account for both the resilience and the efficiency of cooperation.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2023-09-232024-01-172024-02-262024-02
 Publication Status: Issued
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: Peer
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2315558121
 Degree: -

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Project name : Marie Skłodowska-Curie
Grant ID : 754411
Funding program : Horizon 2020 (H2020)
Funding organization : European Commission (EC)
Project name : Starting grant E-DIRECT
Grant ID : 850529
Funding program : Horizon Europe (HE)
Funding organization : European Commission (EC)

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Title: PNAS
  Other : Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
  Other : Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA
  Abbreviation : Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.
Source Genre: Journal
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Publ. Info: Washington, D.C. : National Academy of Sciences
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 121 (10) Sequence Number: e2315558121 Start / End Page: - Identifier: ISSN: 0027-8424
CoNE: https://pure.mpg.de/cone/journals/resource/954925427230