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  The Political Economy of Paternalism

Konrad, K. A. (2023). The Political Economy of Paternalism. Working Paper of the Max Plank Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, No. 2023-02. doi:10.2139/ssrn.4351518.

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https://ssrn.com/abstract=4351518 (Preprint)
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 Creators:
Konrad, Kai A.1, Author           
Affiliations:
1Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society, ou_830552              

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Free keywords: paternalism, libertarianism, autonomous decision-making, majoritarian decisions, decision skills, formation of decision capabilities
 Abstract: The study predicts how individual preferences and majoritarian political decisions about the extent of paternalism in a society depend on the distribution of genuine preferences for economic activi-
ties, the distribution of information about these preferences, and the distribution of capabilities for individual decision-making. It explains observed heterogeneity of preferences and suggests that citizens with eccentric tastes and with high decision-making abilities favor a libertarian regime. If decision-making ability is a learnable activity, a feed-back loop emerges between anticipated majority decisions about paternalism and individual investments in citizens own decision-making
abilities, leading to a multiplicity of majoritarian political equilibria.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2023-02-09
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: 37
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4351518
 Degree: -

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Title: Working Paper of the Max Plank Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Source Genre: Series
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: No. 2023-02 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: - Identifier: -