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  Between Legality and Illegality: How Misclassification and Partial Enforcement Transformed the Italian Labour Market

Bolelli, M. (2024). Between Legality and Illegality: How Misclassification and Partial Enforcement Transformed the Italian Labour Market. PhD Thesis, University of Duisburg-Essen, Cologne.

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Bolelli, Monica1, 2, Author           
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1International Max Planck Research School on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_1214550              
2University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany, ou_persistent22              

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 Abstract: This dissertation contributes to our understanding of the role of illegality in the organisation of modern regulated economies and their labour markets. Through the study of rule-breaking in the context of labour-intensive subcontracting practices, I show how illegality can become a structural feature of competition models based on cost containment, even inside institutional systems built on the premise of rule-abidance. Fraudulent subcontracting practices that entail high levels of exploitation are just the most extreme expression of cost containment practices that are widespread and tolerated. Besides being the outcome of employers’ strategies based on the creation of hidden triangular employment relationships through misclassification and on the fostering of migrant workers’ vulnerability, the expansion of illegal practices derives from state inaction and its active promotion of restructuring practices based on cost-containment. The state does not necessarily encourage extreme cases of rule-breaking, but it also fails at adequately regulating them because this would be an obstacle to predominant competitive strategies and business models. This conflict of interests generates contradictions in the design of labour market policies that prevent effective rule enforcement. Eventually, the outcome of employers’ strategy and states’ forbearance is the modification of the operation of labour markets through the hidden expansion of a market for intermediation services and the creation of new employment statuses that crystallise the outcomes of segmentation strategies. What emerges from this study is that the struggle around the definition of institutional systems of industrial relations is not just a power-based debate over regulation but also a silent discussion over the amount of rule-breaking that can be tolerated. In this sense, rule-breaking is a fundamental part of institution-building processes in regulated labour markets, one which needs to be further explored to fully understand the dynamics of contemporary capitalism.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2023-12-142024
 Publication Status: Issued
 Pages: vii, 202
 Publishing info: Cologne : University of Duisburg-Essen
 Table of Contents: LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
1.2 STATE OF THE ART
1.3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
1.3.1 Organizational Characteristics and Market Structures
1.3.2 Institutions and Enforcement
1.3.3 The Triangular Employment Relationship
1.3.4 Shaping Market Structures
1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN
1.4.1 Commercial Relationship
1.4.2 Employment Dimension
1.4.3 Institutions and Enforcement
1.5 RESEARCH FOCUS: NORTHERN ITALY
1.6 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
1.7. STRUCTURE OF THE CHAPTERS

PART I: PRACTICES
CHAPTER 2: MISCLASSIFICATION
2.1 SUBCONTRACTING AS A DUMPING STRATEGY
2.2 MISCLASSIFICATION, AVOIDANCE AND ILLEGALITY
2.3 STAGING AS A TECHNIQUE OF MISCLASSIFICATION
2.3.1 Staging Through a Fictitious Company
2.3.2 Scenic Designs and Stage Props
2.3.3 Cooperatives
2.3.4 Figureheads, Pirate Contracts and Certifications
2.3.5 Clothing, Partitioning Lines and Tools
2.4 FRAUDULENT SUBCONTRACTING WITHOUT THE USE OF A FICTITIOUS COMPANY

CHAPTER 3: LABOUR-INTENSIVE SUBCONTRACTING AS INTERMEDIATION
3.1 INTERMEDIATION AND INTERPOSITION
3.2 INFORMAL INTERMEDIARIES
3.2.1. A Matter of Organised Crime?
3.3 SERVICE COMPANIES, LABOUR-INTENSIVE SUBCONTRACTING AND INTERMEDIATION
3.3.1 Cooperatives
3.4 AGENCIES
3.5 MAKING THE MARKET FOR INTERMEDIATION SERVICES POSSIBLE: THE ROLE OF CONSULTANTS
3.6 LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION THROUGH MISCLASSIFICATION

CHAPTER 4: SUBCONTRACTING IN ITALIAN CAPITALISM
4.1 FROM THE SECOND WORLD WAR TO THE “ECONOMIC BOOM.”
4.2 AFTER THE CRISIS: THE 1970S
4.3 FROM THE SECOND ECONOMIC BOOM TO TODAY

PART II: INSTITUTIONS
CHAPTER 5: FORBEARANCE AND LABOUR INTERMEDIATION
5.1 THE ROLE OF THE STATE
5.2 (DE)REGULATING INTERMEDIATION
5.2.1 “Greying” the Concept of Intermediation
5.2.2 Between Practices and the Law
5.2.3 The Introduction of Private Placement
5.2.4 The Re-Definition of Illicit Intermediation
5.2.5 Changing the Sanctioning Regime
5.2.6 The Strange Case of Posting
5.3 A WEAK IMPLEMENTATION SYSTEM
5.3.1 A Lack of Resources
5.3.2 The Lack of a Monitoring Strategy and the Problem of Certifications
5.4 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INSTITUTIONS AND COOPERATIVES
5.5 MIGRATION POLICIES
5.6 ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES
5.7 EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND SEGMENTATION
5.8 PARTIAL ENFORCEMENT AS DESIGN AND CONTRADICTION

CHAPTER 6: THE POLITICS OF THE REFORM OF THE REGIME OF LABOUR
INTERMEDIATION
6.1 THE REFORM PROCESS
6.1.1 Before 2003: the 1990es and the Introduction of Agency Work
6.1.2 The Reform of 2003 and the Liberalisation of Private Placement
6.1.3 The Years of the Crisis and the Approval of the Law Against Caporalato
6.1.4 The Centre-Left Government and the Decriminalisation of Fraudulent Subcontracting
6.1.5 The Governments of the 5 Stars Movement and the Proposal for the Reinstatement of the Ban on Intermediation
6.2 NOT ONLY GOVERNMENTS: ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND THE JURISPRUDENCE
6.3 THE OTHER ACTORS OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATION SYSTEM
6.3.1 Unions
6.3.2 Employers’ Associations
6.4 HOW MUCH RULE BREAKING?

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS
7.1 MISCLASSIFICATION, STAGING AND FICTITIOUS COMPANIES
7.2 A MARKET FOR INTERMEDIATION SERVICES
7.2.1 The Role of Consultants
7.2.2 Misclassification and Cooperatives
7.3 MISCLASSIFICATION, FORBEARANCE AND THE STATE
7.3.1 Sabotage Through the Greying of Institutions
7.3.2 The Connection Between Forbearance and Failure
7.4 MISCLASSIFICATION AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
7.5. GOING FORWARD

REFERENCES
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: ISBN: 978-3-946416-30-2
DOI: 10.17185/duepublico/82729
 Degree: PhD

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Title: Studies on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy. IMPRS-SPCE
Source Genre: Series
 Creator(s):
International Max Planck Research School on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, Editor              
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