Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the 
provision of public goods

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang

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Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods

Konrad, K. A., & Leininger, W. (2011). Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods. Public choice, 146(3-4), 501-520.

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Item Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0011-3DB7-4 Version Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0011-3DB9-F

Genre: Journal Article

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Creators:
Konrad, Kai A.¹, Author
Leininger, Wolfgang², Author

Affiliations:
1Public Economics, MPI for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, Max Planck Society, ou_830548
2External Organizations, ou_persistent22

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Language(s): eng - English

Dates: Date issued: 2011

Publication Status: Issued

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Title: Public choice

Source Genre: Journal

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Publ. Info: Dordrecht : Springer

Pages: - Volume / Issue: 146 (3-4) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 501 - 520 Identifier: ISSN: 0048-5829
ZDB: 207597-0
CoNE: https://pure.mpg.de/cone/journals/resource/954925456996