Powerful Remnants? The Politics of Egalitarian Bargaining Institutions in Italy 
and Sweden

Oliver, Rebecca J.

doi:10.1093/ser/mwq030

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学術論文

Powerful Remnants? The Politics of Egalitarian Bargaining Institutions in Italy and Sweden

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Oliver, Rebecca J.
Projekte von Gastwissenschaftlern und Postdoc-Stipendiaten, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;
Department of Political Science, Miami University, Oxford, OH, USA;

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwq030
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SER_9_2011_Oliver.pdf
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引用

Oliver, R. J. (2011). Powerful Remnants? The Politics of Egalitarian Bargaining Institutions in Italy and Sweden. Socio-Economic Review, 9(3), 533-566. doi:10.1093/ser/mwq030.

引用: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0012-3F6C-4

要旨

Why are some countries better able to sustain egalitarian outcomes attained in past decades in the current inhospitable conditions? Moreover, why have egalitarian practices proven fragile in some countries with traditionally strong social democratic governments and powerful unions and yet have been sustained in countries with disjointed unions and right-wing parties in power? Italy and Sweden, the central cases examined in this paper, reflect these diverging trends. In view of understanding why certain countries better sustain egalitarian institutions and outcomes, the paper investigates how two inter-related institutional traits set countries apart in terms of how egalitarian institutions were constructed and dismantled and how these traits influenced the type of institutional remnants and bargaining dynamics maintained in the aftermath. The two traits in question are: (a) the type of confederal groupings and; (b) the range of wage scale coverage.