日本語
 
Help Privacy Policy ポリシー/免責事項
  詳細検索ブラウズ

アイテム詳細


公開

学術論文

What Motivates the Gatekeepers? Explaining Governing Party Preferences on Immigration

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons41144

Breunig,  Christian
Projekte von Gastwissenschaftlern und Postdoc-Stipendiaten, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;
Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, Canada;

Fulltext (restricted access)
There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.
フルテキスト (公開)

Gov_21_2008_Breunig.pdf
(出版社版), 263KB

付随資料 (公開)
There is no public supplementary material available
引用

Breunig, C., & Luedtke, A. (2008). What Motivates the Gatekeepers? Explaining Governing Party Preferences on Immigration. Governance, 21(1), 123-146. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2007.00388.x.


引用: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0012-4689-D
要旨
Most scholarship on immigration politics is made up of isolated case studies or cross-disciplinary work that does not build on existing political science theory. This study attempts to remedy this shortcoming in three ways: (1) we derive theories from the growing body of immigration literature, to hypothesize about why political parties would be more or less open to immigration; (2) we link these theories to the broader political science literature on parties and institutions; and (3) we construct a data set on the determinants of immigration politics, covering 18 developed countries from 1987 to 1999. Our primary hypothesis is that political institutions shape immigration politics by facilitating or constraining majoritarian sentiment (which is generally opposed to liberalizing immigration). Our analysis finds that in political systems where majoritarianism is constrained by institutional "checks," governing parties support immigration more strongly, even when controlling for a broad range of alternative explanations.