A More Efficient and Accountable Federalism? An Analysis of the Consequences of 
Germany’s 2006 Constitutional Reform

Burkhart, Simone; Manow, Philip; Ziblatt, Daniel

doi:10.1080/09644000802501349

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A More Efficient and Accountable Federalism? An Analysis of the Consequences of Germany’s 2006 Constitutional Reform

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Burkhart, Simone
Politik und politische Ökonomie, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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Manow, Philip
Politik und politische Ökonomie, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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Ziblatt, Daniel
Projekte von Gastwissenschaftlern und Postdoc-Stipendiaten, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;
Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA;

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644000802501349
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Citation

Burkhart, S., Manow, P., & Ziblatt, D. (2008). A More Efficient and Accountable Federalism? An Analysis of the Consequences of Germany’s 2006 Constitutional Reform. German Politics, 17(4), 522-540. doi:10.1080/09644000802501349.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0012-4836-8

Abstract

The German federal reform adopted in 2006 aims to enhance efficiency and
accountability of governance by disentangling the intertwined levels of government
and by reducing the veto rights of the Bundesrat, Germany’s strong second
chamber. In this article, we assess the degree to which reform in these areas has
been fulfilled. In particular we ask if the reform will i) accelerate the legislative
decision-making process, ii) expand the freedom of political action of the federal
government and iii) disentangle the competencies between the intertwined levels
of German government. Our analysis shows a remarkable gap between the ambitious
goals of reformers and the reality of the actual reform outcome.