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Journal Article

Electoral Rules and Legislative Turnover: Evidence from Germany's Mixed Electoral System


Manow,  Philip
Politik und politische Ökonomie, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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Manow, P. (2007). Electoral Rules and Legislative Turnover: Evidence from Germany's Mixed Electoral System. West European Politics, 30(1), 195-207. doi:10.1080/01402380601019852.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0012-48E7-7
Germany has a mixed electoral system which combines a nominal vote with simple
majority in single-member districts and regional closed-list PR. Studies on the effects of
electoral rules therefore find in the German system a testing ground that holds constant
many contextual factors, although the possibility of mutual ‘contamination’ of electoral
rules prevents the measurement of ‘pure’ effects. The influence that electoral rules have
on the chances of re-election recently has attracted increased scholarly interest. This
article analyses parliamentary turnover for all 16 German federal elections since 1949.
The study reports much lower re-election prospects for German members of parliament
than previous studies, but confirms earlier findings as to the impact of electoral rules on
turnover: direct candidates have higher chances of being re-elected than list-candidates;
being double-listed significantly increases the prospect of re-election; and parliamentary
turnover increases with the length of the term.