Legislative Self-Restraint under Divided Government in Germany, 1976-2002

Manow, Philip; Burkhart, Simone

doi:10.3162/036298007780907941

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Legislative Self-Restraint under Divided Government in Germany, 1976-2002

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Manow, Philip
Politik und politische Ökonomie, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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Burkhart, Simone
Politik und politische Ökonomie, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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http://dx.doi.org/10.3162/036298007780907941
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LSQ_32-07_Manow_Burkhart.pdf
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Citation

Manow, P., & Burkhart, S. (2007). Legislative Self-Restraint under Divided Government in Germany, 1976-2002. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 32(2), 470-494. doi:10.3162/036298007780907941.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0012-499C-9

Abstract

Using the Vanberg (1998) model of legislative autolimitation from the judicial review literature, we investigated the impact of divided government on the strategic choices of government and opposition. The main prediction of the model is that a strong opposition dominance in the second chamber (Bundesrat) usually does not lead to open party-political conflict, but rather to a government's legislative self-restraint. We tested the hypotheses following from the model on a detailed dataset comprising all legislative bills in Germany between 1976 and 2002. The results show that the main effects of divided government are, in fact, indirect and anticipatory. We conclude that when majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat diverge, the impact on legislation is substantial.