Control of a Terrorist Network: Lessons from the 9/11 Commission Report

Mayntz, Renate

doi:10.1080/10967490600899622

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Control of a Terrorist Network: Lessons from the 9/11 Commission Report

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Mayntz, Renate
Globale Strukturen und ihre Steuerung, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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https://doi.org/10.1080/10967490600899622
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Citation

Mayntz, R. (2006). Control of a Terrorist Network: Lessons from the 9/11 Commission Report. International Public Management Journal, 9(3), 295-311. doi:10.1080/10967490600899622.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0012-4BE1-E

Abstract

The 567-page 9=11 Commission Report traces the actions of the Al Qaeda terrorists that led up to the 9=11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and describes in detail the counter-terrorism activities of the organizations and offices in the American security community, focusing on the missed opportunities to prevent the attack. A careful analysis of the report permits us to identify the organizational, managerial, and cognitive preconditions of successful prevention. The analysis also shows that hard-to-control factors in the policy environment severely restrict the choice of prevention
strategies. The pre-9=11 counter-terrorism measures of the U.S. were ill adapted to the special character of the threat posed by a transnational terrorist network.